DOCUMENTATION · UNISWAP V4 SWAP REBATE HOOK
Arbitrage still happens.
We change where the value goes.
WTH is a live Uniswap v4 hook that captures eligible price gaps between connected pools and turns realized arbitrage profit into swapper cashback, LP rewards and protocol revenue. This page is the whole reference: what the hook does, how the money is split, how to connect a pool, and the market the protocol is built for.
The protocol
What the hook does, where the profit comes from, who gets paid, and how a project connects its own pools.
START PART II–III · 10–24The market
Why v4 hooks matter now, what has already been captured on chain, how the opportunity is sized, and where the risk sits.
OPEN REFERENCE · 25Deployed addresses
Every contract the system runs on, live on Robinhood Chain — copy an address or open it on the explorer.
VIEWPART I · THE PROTOCOL · 01–09
Keep more of the value created by each trade.
WTH is a tool that looks for profit created when two trading pools show different prices. If it can safely capture that profit, it shares the money with the trader and the people supplying the pools instead of letting an outside bot take all of it.
Money back on your own trade
The swap that opened the gap earns a rebate out of the profit that closing it produced.
More value for pool providers
On a pool that integrates WTH, 45% of every capture is donated back into that pool.
Revenue for the WTH system
When a third-party token uses the hook, the WTH treasury receives a defined share — 40% of the captured profit.
Today, outside bots often keep the profit.
Price correction is useful. But the money made from that correction usually leaves the traders and pools that created the opportunity.
Why the hook is useful
It gives the price-correction profit a chance to stay with the trader, the pool providers and the protocol, instead of being taken entirely by an outside searcher.
The basic safety rule
The hook should only act when the profit is expected to be larger than pool fees, network costs and the effect of moving the price.
Extra rules attached to a Uniswap v4 pool.
A hook is code that runs automatically around pool actions. It lets a pool do more than basic swapping and fee collection.
The pool can follow extra instructions.
Uniswap v4 hooks can run at selected points — before or after a swap, when liquidity changes, or when a pool is created. The WTH hook uses that surface to check connected pools, capture positive price-gap profit, and split it automatically.
What it does not do
It does not guarantee a payout on every trade. A reward only exists when the hook completes a profitable correction after costs.
Where it can be used
A hook is attached when a new v4 pool is created. An existing v3 pool stays unchanged; a new v4 pool is created beside it.
Capture inside the swap flow.
WTH checks a set of connected pools immediately after the triggering swap. It only acts when the correction is still profitable at the moment of execution.
Bounded routes
A limited set of approved paths is checked. A swap can never trigger an open-ended search.
Same transaction
Detection, correction and settlement all complete inside the transaction that triggered them.
Realized balances
Payouts come from balances that actually settled — never from an optimistic quote.
It also looks at v3
The hook does not only compare its own two pools. It detects v3 pools holding the same base token and arbitrages against those as well — more venues to compare against means more divergence available to capture.
Three legs, and venues we do not own
A correction no longer has to be a straight there-and-back between two pools. The executor can carry a third leg, and that is what puts exotic pairs in reach: a TOKEN/STOCK pool has nothing to trade against directly, but it has a counterpart two hops away through a quote pair. Most pairs on the chain become reachable this way.
PropAMM arbitrage
The hook arbitrages against propAMMs for Robinhood stock tokens — professionally quoted venues that WTH neither owns nor needs to. When a connected pool and one of those venues disagree on price, the gap is closed inside the same transaction, and the value stays with the pool instead of leaving with an outside searcher. Hooked USDG pools are deployed for NVDA, SPCX, SNDK, AAPL, GOOGL and MU, each at two fee tiers — 0.0375% and 0.1%. Liquidity can be provided from the dashboard, and further Stock Token/USDG pools can be created by anyone.
Three pools, one transaction
Triangular routes are live. They inherit every rule above — bounded paths, realized balances, and no trade without realized profit.
Tokenized stocks
Stock pairs quoted in USDG are corrected against outside venues, including pools that carry no hook of their own.
ETH · USDG
A swap can also trigger an independent arbitrage on the chain's main ETH/USDG pairs. When it does, the trader's rebate is larger. The leg can be switched off.
Source: PoolManager swap logs read by executor address; the connected pools are listed on the live dashboard.
What happens when someone trades WTH.
The hook checks whether the WTH trade created a profitable price difference between the approved WTH pools.
Why traders may care
A normal trade can create a price gap. With the hook, the trader who created that opportunity may receive part of the captured profit back as a rebate.
Why pool providers may care
Liquidity providers are the people who supply tokens to the pools. They receive the larger share of any positive profit the hook captures.
How the captured profit is shared.
The split depends on whose pool the arbitrage touched — not on the direction of the trade. Every percentage below is a share of captured profit — never of the trade amount.
| Who receives it | WTH pools | Integrating pools | How it is paid |
|---|---|---|---|
| Swapper | 10.0% | 5.0% | Cashback, in the same transaction |
| Integrating pool | — | 45.0% | Donated to the pool's liquidity providers |
| WTH treasury | 90.0% | 40.0% | Protocol revenue |
| Referral | — | 10.0% | To the partner WTH set for that pool |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
On an integrating pool the referral and treasury shares come off the top — 10% and 40% by default. The remaining 50% is then divided 10 / 90: one tenth back to the swapper as cashback, nine tenths donated to the pool the trade happened in. That is where 5% and 45% come from. On WTH's own pools there is no pool donation and no referral: the swapper takes 10% and the treasury the rest.
Splits can change
Shares are set per deployment. Custom integrations can carry a different split, agreed with WTH.
Referral share
The referral recipient and its share are set by WTH for each pool — a partner does not claim it. It comes out of the same realized profit before the swapper and pool shares are computed; it never creates new payout.
Arrangements agreed directly
Custom implementations
For selected partners the split above is not the only one on offer. The allocation between swappers, LPs, the treasury and the partner is set by the terms of the partnership, case by case.
Referral program
Custom referral links are available to influencers, communities and other distribution partners. Terms and revenue share are agreed directly with WTH — this is not a permissionless feature.
The token shows the hook working.
WTH is the native example of the system. Its treasury receives a share of every capture, and the token gives the project one visible asset for integrations, demonstrations and promotion.
A live example
WTH pools make the hook easier to demonstrate with a real token and real pool flow.
A protocol share
When another token uses the hook, the WTH treasury receives 40% of the captured profit; on WTH's own pools it receives 90%.
A clear focal point
The token gives dashboards, integrations, demonstrations and campaigns one visible asset to point to.
Projects with at least two pools can plug in.
Create two Uniswap v4 pools for the same asset against the same supported quote, attach the WTH hook at creation, then fund active liquidity.
The creation link comes prefilled
The setup link presets the hook address and tick spacing. The project only needs to initialize the price and supply liquidity.
Supported quotes: USDG · ETH · WETH. The hook works best with two or more connected pools holding active liquidity near the market price.
BUILD A PRESET LINK ON THE DASHBOARDThe manual path, in the Uniswap app
Four parts keep the system controlled.
The hook separates pool approval, route checking, trade execution and payouts, so each job is easier to inspect, test and pause.
Pool list
Keeps the list of pools and tokens the hook is allowed to use.
Route checker
Looks at a limited set of paths and estimates whether a safe profit exists.
Executor
Runs the price-correction trade and closes all token balances in the same protected process.
Payout ledger
Records the trader and pool shares, and prevents the system from paying more than it captured.
PART II · THE MARKET · 10–18
Programmable pools can keep their own upside.
Uniswap v4 hooks let pool creators attach custom logic to pool actions. Most hooks customize pool behaviour; WTH uses that same surface for value capture, not just fee tweaks.
Volume moves prices
A swap can create a temporary price gap between pools quoting the same token.
Hooks add logic
Custom code can run around swaps, liquidity changes, donations and initialization.
WTH captures value
Eligible gaps can be corrected inside the pool system, before external actors act.
Every payout is on chain
Rebates, LP rewards and logs are visible at transaction level.
Sources: Uniswap Labs, “Uniswap v4 is Here” (2025); Uniswap v4 developer documentation.
Pools create the opportunity. Bots take the upside.
Every AMM swap changes reserves. If another pool still has a better executable price, the correction is useful — but the payout usually leaves the pool ecosystem.
Source: R. Fritsch & A. Canidio, “Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity,” WWW Companion 2024.
Hooks enable growth like never before.
Hooks are modular plugins for pool logic. They can run around swaps, liquidity changes, donations and pool initialization — which turns the AMM into a developer platform.
Sources: Uniswap Labs, “Uniswap v4 is Here” (Jan 2025); “Spark Moves $150M of Liquidity to v4” (Jun 2026); DeFiLlama (Aug 2026).
Concept put into practice.
A live 2.50 WETH trade opened a price gap. WTH closed it inside the same transaction and split 0.168 WETH of realized profit on the 40 / 60 buy rule that applied at the time.
Source: Robinhood Chain block explorer.
The full economic loop is already running.
The dataset is still small, but the complete loop is live on chain: detect, capture, settle, rebate, and reward LPs.
Figures as of 3 September 2026 · refreshed live from the collector when it answers.
Capture rate per eligible price gap · realized profit per $1M of volume · incremental LP return.
Source: on-chain logs — the running totals are published on the live dashboard and tracked independently by DefiLlama , which reads the same distribution event from the chain.
Atomic arbitrage already moves tens of millions.
The closest public data to WTH is on-chain atomic arbitrage — in particular DEX-to-DEX “naked” arbitrage and transaction-triggered backruns.
Sources: Ethereum Research / libMEV, “Open vs. Sealed”; Flashbots Collective, “Searching in TDX”; arXiv:2404.05803 for LP arbitrage-loss context.
Built bottom-up from volume, not from an MEV total.
No academic MEV total is used as TAM. The market is built from trading volume downward, with every input either sourced or labelled as an assumption.
| Layer | Size | What it is | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| TAM | ~$3.4T | Global annual spot DEX volume (2025) — the theoretical surface where pool-level internalization of arbitrage surplus could apply. | CoinGecko / DeFiLlama; approximate |
| SAM | ~$300B | Uniswap v4 annualized volume run-rate (≈$25.5B × 12) across 18 chains — where the hook can operate today. A run-rate, not a full-year figure. | DeFiLlama, Aug 2026 |
| SOM | $0.3–40B | Managed volume at 0.1%–3.0% penetration of addressable v4 volume — a scenario range driven by integrations, eligible pools and routes. | Assumption — see §17 |
Driver-based scenarios, not an arbitrary CAGR.
Two lines of arithmetic drive the whole model. Every figure below is reconstructable from the stated inputs.
Managed volume = v4 volume × penetration
Captured value = managed volume × yield (bps)
| Assumption | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|
| v4 volume growth p.a. | +5% | +25% | +45% |
| Penetration by 2030E | 0.25% | 1.0% | 3.0% |
| Capture yield | 2 bps | 5 bps | 10 bps |
| 2030E captured value | $0.2M | $3.7M | $39.8M |
Logarithmic vertical axis, so all three scenarios stay legible — they sit roughly one order of magnitude apart. Penetration is ramped linearly to its 2030E target; volume compounds at the stated rate from the $300B 2026E base. Base data: DeFiLlama.
| Captured value ($M) | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E | 2030E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.18 |
| Base | 0.30 | 0.75 | 1.41 | 2.34 | 3.66 |
| Bull | 1.80 | 5.22 | 11.35 | 21.95 | 39.78 |
A log-linear fit of DEX volume over 2021–25 implies ≈41% growth per year (R² ≈ 0.68). All three scenarios deliberately sit below that trend, given crypto's cyclicality.
v4's history is too short for a credible logistic adoption fit. These are labelled assumptions, not curve fits, and 2026E uses YTD run-rates — never presented as realized volume.
Penetration × capture yield drives the outcome.
Annual captured arbitrage value on an illustrative $500B of addressable v4 volume. With limited operating history, ranges beat false precision.
| Yield \ Penetration | 0.1% | 0.5% | 1.0% | 2.0% | 5.0% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 bps | $0.1M | $0.5M | $1.0M | $2.0M | $5.0M |
| 5 bps | $0.3M | $1.3M | $2.5M | $5.0M | $13M |
| 10 bps | $0.5M | $2.5M | $5.0M | $10M | $25M |
| 20 bps | $1.0M | $5.0M | $10M | $20M | $50M |
Illustrative: $500B ≈ mid-scenario 2027–28 addressable v4 volume (assumption; base data DeFiLlama).
PART III · STRATEGY · 19–24
Protection exists. Pool-level redistribution is the gap.
WTH is not claimed strictly superior. UniswapX and MEV Blocker are proven at larger scale, and searchers compete for every opportunity. The narrower claim is this: redistribution attached to the pool itself, shared with LPs and third-party communities.
| WTH | UniswapX | MEV Blocker | External searchers | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Architecture | v4 hook inside the pool | Intent / Dutch-auction order flow | Private RPC + order-flow auction | Off-chain bots + on-chain execution |
| Point of integration | Pool creation (hook attach) | Swapper routing / interface | User wallet RPC setting | None — permissionless |
| Surplus recipient | Swapper + LPs + treasury (+ referral) | Swapper (price improvement) | User (backrun rebate) | Searcher / builder / validator |
| LP participation | Yes — 45% of capture on integrating pools | No | No | No |
| Third-party token integration | Core design (2+ pools, referrals) | No | No | n/a |
| Private RPC / order flow needed | No | Uses filler network | Yes | No |
| Uniswap v4 dependence | High | Low | None | None |
Sources: UniswapX and MEV Blocker official documentation; Ethereum MEV research.
Strategy snapshot.
WTH is strongest when positioned as infrastructure for measurable, sustainable value increase — not as a yield product.
Live proof of same-transaction capture. A simple user story: arbitrage still happens; the payout changes. Built on Uniswap v4 instead of requiring a new AMM.
Capture depends on active liquidity, approved routes and execution costs. More pools can fragment liquidity. The security and audit burden is higher than for a normal pool.
Projects need non-emission LP incentives. Hooks can become a default layer for pool-specific economics. Referral economics can make integrations distribution-led.
Future competitor hooks, and adverse regulation around rewards.
Sources: Uniswap v4 docs; LP arbitrage-loss literature.
Macro map for adoption risk.
The hook is a protocol product, not a consumer app. Adoption depends on regulation, integration friction, liquidity behaviour and provable on-chain performance.
Sources: Uniswap v4 hook documentation; Fritsch & Canidio 2024; Ethereum Research / libMEV market data.
Where the pressure comes from.
For a hook protocol the market is not just DEXs. It is projects, LPs, routers, searchers, auditors, chains and governance surfaces — all pressing on one engine: detect · correct · settle · distribute.
Framework adapted from Porter industry analysis. Technical context: Uniswap v4 hooks and Ethereum MEV research.
Growth without changing the core engine.
The capture mechanism stays constant. Growth comes from more pools, more integrations, and more ways to route realized profit.
WTH pairs and early partner pools
Increase active liquidity, improve capture rate, publish dashboard receipts, and make performance legible.
More token projects and chains
Repeat the same 2+ pool setup across tokens, supported quotes and L2 deployments.
Configurable incentive layers
Add referral splits, project-set parameters, better reporting and route templates — without changing the capture core.
Protocol capture as a primitive
Longer term: routing partnerships, launchpad integrations, analytics and branded pool products.
Framework adapted from the Ansoff growth matrix.
Where the hook goes next.
The engine is chain-agnostic by construction: it reads pools, compares prices and settles inside one transaction. What follows is where that engine goes next, and what it is given to do.
REFERENCE · ON CHAIN · 25
Every part of the system, on chain.
Robinhood Chain. Each address below is the live contract the dashboard itself reads — click one to copy it, or open it on the explorer to check the code and every transaction it has ever made.
WTH
The token itself. Fixed supply, no mint function — most of it sits in the pools the hook works.
WTH hook
The Uniswap v4 hook every connected pool is initialised with. It emits the payout event the dashboard counts, and it is the address a project enters to plug its own pool in.
ArbExecutor
Runs the price-correction trade inside the swap and closes every balance in the same protected process. Earlier generations stay readable on chain, so the history never breaks when the executor is upgraded.
PositionFeeClaimer
Collects the swap fees owed to the protocol's own liquidity positions.
Safe multisig
Holds the administrative keys — approving pools and routes, and pausing the hook if one becomes unsafe. No single key can act alone.
The arbitrage still happens.
We change who gets paid.
Live mechanism. Reusable hook. Configurable economics — for connected pools that want to keep the value their own volume creates.